CouponCabin v. Savings.com by Northern District of Indiana
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
 
COUPONCABIN LLC,   ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff,    ) 
      )  
 v.     ) CAUSE NO.: 2:14-CV-39-TLS 
      ) 
SAVINGS.COM, INC., COX TARGET ) 
MEDIA, INC., LINFIELD MEDIA, LLC, ) 
INTERNET BRANDS, INC., SAZZE, INC. ) 
d/b/a DEALSPLUS, and   ) 
Does 1 through 10,    ) 
      ) 
 Defendants.    ) 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Linfield Media, LLC’s Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings [ECF No. 119], filed on October 13, 2016. For the reasons stated 
below, the Court denies the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Plaintiff CouponCabin LLC filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] against Defendants Linfield 
Media, LLC, Savings.Com, Inc., Cox Target Media, Inc., Internet Brands, Inc., d/b/a DealsPlus, 
and Does 1 through 10 (collectively “the Defendants”) that was amended on November 2, 2015. 
The Amended Complaint [ECF No. 28] alleged that the Defendants “scraped” the Plaintiff’s 
websites, which means to “electronically copy, retrieve or otherwise acquire data and 
information from the websites of others with little or no human interaction.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 4, 
ECF No. 28.) This “scraping” allegedly violated the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA) and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) (Id. ¶¶ 56–67), and was also a 
breach of contract, trespass, and interference with prospective business advantage (Id. ¶¶ 68–92). 
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The facts surrounding this dispute are laid out in greater detail in the Court’s Order [ECF No. 87] 
of June 8, 2016.  
The Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, and on June 8, 2016, the 
Court granted the Motion as to the DMCA claim but denied it as to all other claims. Thereafter, 
Linfield Media filed a separate Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Plaintiff filed its 
Opposition [ECF No. 123] on October 27, 2016, and Linfield Media’s Reply [ECF No. 124] was 
entered on November 7, 2016. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
A motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(c), permits a party to move for judgment after the complaint and answer have been filed by 
the parties. When reviewing Rule 12(c) motions, a court must review the pleadings under the 
same standard that applies when reviewing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Rule 12(b)(6). Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2007). When 
reviewing a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all of the factual 
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. 
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). The complaint need not contain detailed facts, but surviving a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion “requires more than labels and conclusions . . . . Factual allegations must 
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
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ANALYSIS 
 
 The Court has jurisdiction over the CFAA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. As 
the Court recently ruled on a Motion to Dismiss filed by all Defendants, the present Motion is in 
essence a request that the Court reconsider its past ruling as to just Linfield Media. In the 
Motion, Linfield Media requests judgment on the pleadings on all the Plaintiff’s remaining 
claims. 
 
A. CFAA Claim 
 
The CFAA imposes both civil and criminal liability for the unauthorized access of 
electronic data. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(7). Of relevance here, an individual violates the CFAA 
if he “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access and 
thereby obtains . . . information from any protected computer.” § 1030(a)(2); see Motorola, Inc. 
v. Lemko Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 760, 766 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (“The elements of a section 
1030(a)(2) violation . . . include (1) intentional access of a computer, (2) without or in excess of 
authorization, (3) whereby the defendant obtains information from the protected computer.”). 
The CFAA does not define “without authorization”; although it does define “exceeds authorized 
access,” as “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter 
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” 18 U.S.C.        
§ 1030(e)(6).   
 Liability under § 1030(a)(2) is triggered by the unauthorized access of electronic data—
not by the unauthorized use of such data. Bittman v. Fox, 107 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (N.D. Ill. 
2015) (“The statutory purpose of the CFAA is to punish trespassers and hackers.”); 
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10-3542, 2012 WL 5269213, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 
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25, 2012) (“The CFAA protects against unauthorized access rather than unauthorized use.”); 
Koch Indus., Inc. v. Does, No. 2:10CV1275, 2011 WL 1775765, at *8 (D. Utah May 9, 2011) 
(noting that “[a] majority of courts have concluded” that claims of unauthorized use “lie outside 
the scope of the CFAA”). Because the CFAA does not define “authorization,” the Court must 
give the term its “‘ordinary and plain meaning.’” United States v. Patel, 778 F.3d 607, 613 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (quoting Sanders v. Jackson, 209 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[w]e 
frequently look to dictionaries to determine the plain meaning of words, and in particular we 
look at how a phrase was defined at the time the statute was drafted and enacted.”)). The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines “Authorization” as “[t]he action of authorizing a person or thing” or 
“formal permission or approval.” Authorization, oed.com, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/13351 (last visited Jan. 5, 2017). As a verb, “authorize” 
ordinarily means “to give official permission for or formal approval to (an action, undertaking, 
etc.)” or “to approve, sanction.” Authorize, oed.com, http://www.oed.com/view/ Entry/13352 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2017). Therefore, based on the ordinary and plain meaning of 
“authorization,” to act “without authorization” is to act without formal permission or approval.     
 A review of case law shows that several district courts have adopted a similar 
interpretation of “without authorization” when confronting nearly identical facts. For example, in 
Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2013), a defendant accessed the 
plaintiff’s public website even after the plaintiff sent cease-and-desist letters and blocked the 
defendant’s IP addresses. Id. at 1180–81. In finding that the defendant acted “without 
authorization” under the CFAA, the court explained that although the plaintiff “gave the world 
permission (i.e., ‘authorization’) to access the public information on its public website . . . it 
rescinded that permission for [the defendant]. Further access by [the defendant] after that 
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rescission was ‘without authorization.’” Id. at 1184; see also Facebook, Inc. v. Grunin, 77 F. 
Supp. 3d 965, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that a defendant acted “without authorization” 
under the CFAA when he continued to access Facebook’s site, even after Facebook 
“implemented a complete access restriction by sending [the defendant] two cease-and-desist 
letters and by taking technical measures to block his access.”); Sw. Airlines v. Farechase, 318 F. 
Supp. 2d 435, 439–40 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (finding that a plaintiff plausibly alleged a CFAA claim 
when Southwest “directly informed” the defendant that its scraping activity violated the Use 
Agreement on Southwest’s website, which was “accessible from all pages on the website,” as 
well as via “direct repeated warnings and requests to stop scraping.”) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted); cf. QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d 576, 596–97 (E.D. Pa. 
2016) (noting that, in determining whether the defendant acted “without authorization,” the 
“relevant question is not whether [the defendant] was granted permission to access the 
information on [website], but whether that authorization was ever rescinded or limited in a way 
that would put [the defendant] on notice that it was not authorized to access information it was 
otherwise entitled to access.”).  
 Guidance as to the meaning of “without authorization” is also found in CFAA cases 
involving employer-employee relationships. Notably, in International Airport Centers, LLC v. 
Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit found that an employee acted “without 
authorization” to access his work computer the moment he engaged in misconduct and decided 
to quit his job. Id. at 420. This was so even though there was an absence of any “hacking” or 
other techniques aimed at penetrating a secure computer or network on the employee’s part. Id.; 
cf. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] person uses a 
computer ‘without authorization’ . . . when the person has not received permission to use the 
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computer for any purpose (such as when a hacker accesses someone’s computer without any 
permission), or when the employer has rescinded permission to access someone’s computer and 
the defendant uses the computer anyway.”) Thus, given the ordinary and plain meaning of 
“authorization,” coupled with the case law described above, the Court is persuaded that CFAA 
liability may exist in certain situations where a party’s authorization to access electronic data—
including publicly accessible electronic data—has been affirmatively rescinded or revoked.  
In its present Motion, Linfield Media focuses on the allegation in the Amended 
Complaint that states, “CouponCabin has in the past contacted or communicated with each of the 
Defendants, other than Linfield Media, LLC, to demand that they cease and desist their data 
scraping.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 74 (emphasis added).) Even though the Plaintiff alleged that all the 
Defendants knowingly and intentionally circumvented the Plaintiff’s security measures after it 
blocked their access from certain cloud computing/internet service providers, Linfield Media 
argues that this one allegation shows that it had no notice that its alleged activities were 
unauthorized. Without notice from the Plaintiff, Linfield Media argues that it could not have 
violated the CFAA because it could not have acted “without authorization.” (Mot. J. Pleadings 6, 
ECF No. 119.)  
Such an argument is unpersuasive. The Court must accept all factual allegations in a 
complaint, not cherry pick among them. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93. Considering the 
allegations as a whole, the Court’s reasoning regarding the CFAA claim remains the same as in 
its Order of June 8, 2016. Even if the Plaintiff did not directly communicate to Linfield Media its 
demand to cease and desist scraping-related activities, the Plaintiff alleged that it revoked all of 
the Defendants’ access, including Linfield Media’s. Revocation of website access would have 
been sufficient to give the Defendants constructive notice that they were without authorization to 
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act as they allegedly did. See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133; Resultly, LLC, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 596–
97. Accordingly, the Court denies Linfield Media’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as it 
relates to the CFAA claim. 
 
B. Trespass Claim 
 
 The above reasoning applies equally to the trespass claim. In Indiana, liability for 
trespass1 occurs if either: (a) the trespasser dispossesses the possessor of the chattel; (b) the 
trespasser impairs the chattel’s condition, quality, or value; (c) the trespasser deprives the 
possessor’s use of the chattel for a substantial time; or (d) bodily harm is caused to the possessor 
or a person or thing in which the possessor had a legally protected interest. Terrell v. Rowsey, 
647 N.E.2d 662, 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants 
circumvented the Plaintiff’s security measures once it had blocked their access in order to engage 
in data scraping-related activities. This is sufficient to allege a trespass claim, as it is immaterial 
whether or not the Plaintiff directly communicated with Linfield Media about its alleged 
trespassing. Accordingly, the Court denies Linfield Media’s Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings as it relates to the trespass claim. 
 
C. Breach of Contract Claim 
 
The Plaintiff also asserts breach of contract, alleging that the Defendants violated its 
Terms and Conditions, which appear on its website and prohibit the “systematic retrieval 
(including by use or data mining, robots, or other extraction tools) of data or other content from 
                                                 
1 Most courts have treated a complaint that alleges a state law trespass claim in conjunction with a 
CFAA violation as a trespass to chattels claim, not a trespass to land claim. E.g., Fidlar Techs. v. LPS 
Real Estate Data Sols., 82 F. Supp. 3d 844, 859 (C.D. Ill. 2015); Cassetica Software, Inc. v. Comput. Scis. 
Corp., No. 09 C 0003, 2009 WL 1703015, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2009). 
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the [Plaintiff’s] website.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 5 (quoting Ex. A., Pl.’s Terms and Conditions).) Users 
of the Plaintiff’s website “signify their acceptance of the [Plaintiff’s] Terms and Conditions by 
virtue of their access and use of the Site.” (Id. at ¶ 28 (“The Terms and Conditions state that, 
‘[b]y using the Site, you signify your agreement to these terms and conditions and [the 
Plaintiff’s] Privacy Policy.’”).)   
Under the familiar rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)—which is 
applicable to state law claims that are brought through supplemental jurisdiction, Houben v. 
Telular Corp., 309 F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 2012)—a federal court sitting in diversity applies 
the substantive law of the state in which it sits. “The law concerning contracts is well settled in 
Indiana. An offer, acceptance, plus consideration make up the basis for a contract.” Dimizio v. 
Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “A mutual assent or a meeting of the minds 
on all essential elements or terms must exist in order to form a binding contract.” Homer v. 
Burman, 743 N.E.2d 1144, 1146–47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“Assent to th[e] terms of a contract 
may be expressed by acts which manifest acceptance.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). But as far as the Court can tell, Indiana courts have not weighed in on the validity of 
so-called “browsewrap agreements,” which is the type of agreement at issue here. See Sgouros v. 
TransUnion Corp, No. 14 C 1850, 2015 WL 507584, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2015) (noting that 
browsewrap agreements “do not require users to sign a document or click an ‘accept’ or ‘I agree’ 
button, so users are considered to give assent simply by using the website.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).2 
                                                 
2 An alternative to a browsewrap agreement is a “clickwrap agreement,” which requires an 
affirmative act on the part of the user to manifest assent—namely, the user’s clicking of a button 
accompanying a statement instructing the user that their click constitutes acceptance to the terms at issue. 
Sgouros, 2015 WL 507584, at *4.   
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 However, several district courts in this Circuit have found browsewrap agreements to be 
enforceable when a user has actual or constructive knowledge of the website’s terms and 
conditions. See, e.g., id. at *6; Hussein v. Coinabul, LLC, No. 14 C 5735, 2014 WL 7261240, at 
*2–3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2014); Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 
790–91 (N.D. Ill. 2011); see also Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 
2014). Thus, “[w]hen there is no evidence that users had actual knowledge of terms at issue, the 
validity of a browsewrap contract hinges on whether a website provided reasonable notice of the 
terms of the contract, i.e., whether users could have completed their purchases without ever 
having notice that their purchases are bound by the terms.” Sgouros, 2015 WL 507584, at *6 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).     
 Linfield Media argues that the Plaintiff has failed to allege the existence of an 
enforceable browsewrap agreement; namely, by failing to show that the Defendant had actual or 
constructive notice of the Terms and Conditions. In its June 8, 2016, Order the Court found that  
After reviewing the Plaintiff’s website, as presented in the Defendants’ Exhibit 
[ECF No. 66-1], the Court agrees that a user is not immediately confronted with 
the Plaintiff’s Terms and Conditions; and therefore, a reasonable argument can be 
made that the Terms and Conditions fail to provide constructive notice. 
Nevertheless, the Court is required to view the allegations in a light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, and accept as true all reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from the allegations. Whirlpool, 67 F.3d at 608. The Court is therefore reluctant to 
declare the browsewrap agreement’s unenforceability at this early stage of the 
litigation—particularly in light of the Plaintiff’s allegations that the Defendants 
“knowingly and intentionally circumvented [the Plaintiff’s] security measures in 
order to continue their data scraping activities.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 40.)  
 
(Opinion & Order 15–16, ECF No. 87.) Nevertheless, Linfield Media argues that the Plaintiff did 
not allege that it ever directly communicated with Linfield Media to “demand that they cease and 
desist their data scraping, misappropriation of Coupon Content or data from the [Plaintiff’s] 
website.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 74.) However, it is reasonable to infer from the allegations that Linfield 
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Media had constructive notice as to the website’s Terms and Conditions given that it is a 
business entity in direct competition with the Plaintiff. Based on the pleadings, whether Linfield 
Media had sufficient notice of the Terms and Conditions is more appropriately answered at a 
later point in the litigation.    
 
D. Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Advantage Claim 
 
 In Indiana, a claim for tortious interference with prospective business advantage requires: 
(1) the existence of a valid relationship; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the existence of the 
relationship; (3) the defendant’s intentional interference with that relationship; (4) the absence of 
justification; (5) damages; and (6) illegal conduct. Levee v. Beeching, 729 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2000). Linfield Media moves for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the 
Plaintiff has alleged neither illegal conduct nor facts showing that it acted with intent to injure 
the Plaintiff.  
The first argument is moot because the Court has permitted the claims for violation of the 
CFAA, trespass, and breach of contract to go forward, which means illegal conduct is alleged. 
The second argument rephrases the fourth element based on Indiana case law. See Morgan Asset 
Holding Corp. v. CoBank, 736 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The Indiana Supreme 
Court enumerates certain factors for a court to consider as to the absence of justification,3 “but 
the overriding question is whether the defendant’s conduct has been fair and reasonable under 
the circumstances.” Guinn v. Applied Composites Eng’g, Inc., 994 N.E.2d 1256, 1267 (Ind. Ct. 
                                                 
3 The factors are (a) the nature of the defendant’s conduct; (b) the defendant’s motive; (c) the 
interests of the plaintiff with which the defendant’s conduct interferes; (d) the interests sought to be 
advanced by the defendant; (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the defendant 
and the contractual interests of the plaintiff; (f) the proximity or remoteness of the defendant’s conduct to 
the interference; and (g) the relations between the parties. Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, 638 N.E.2d 1228, 
1235 (Ind. 1994). 
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App. 2013) (quoting Allison v. Union Hosp. Inc., 883 N.E.2d 113, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
When viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, and accepting as true all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations, there are sufficient allegations to infer 
that Linfield Media’s conduct was not fair or reasonable. Whether or not Linfield Media sought 
to improve its own business, doing so by allegedly violating federal and state laws would negate 
any such justification. Based on these pleadings, whether Linfield Media was justified in 
allegedly “scraping” the Plaintiff’s website is more appropriately answered at a later point in the 
litigation.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings. 
 
SO ORDERED on January 10, 2017. 
        s/ Theresa L. Springmann                      
       THERESA L. SPRINGMANN 
       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FORT WAYNE DIVISION 
        
        
 
